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IS CITIZEN SUIT NOTICE JURISDICTIONAL AND WHY DOES
IT MATTER?

With certain limted exceptions, each of the environmental citizen suit
provisions includes a requirement for pre-suit notice and delay before
commencement of litigation. Early on in the history of environmental citizen
suits, courts disagreed about whether to treat the notice requirements as an
absolute precondition to commencement of a suit, or whether the notice
requirement could be varied by the court. Courts treating the notice requirement
as an absolute tended to characterize the requirement as "jurisdictional," while
those that treated the requirement as subject to variation by the court tended to
characterize the requirement as "procedural."
The Supreme Court settled the question of whether notice was mandatory in
1989, in the case of Halhtrom v. Tzlhmook County.' Although the Hulhtrom
decision came down firmly on the side of holding that notice is an absolute
precondition to commencement of a citizen suit, the Court carefully, and
explicitly, stopped short of holding that the notice requirement "is jurisdictional
in the strict sense of the term."'
Nevertheless, courts applying Hulhtrom
frequently characterize the notice requirement as a jurisdictionalrequirement, and
many cite Halhtmm specifically for this proposition, despite the reservation in the
Court's Halltmm decision. More recently, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Enuimnment, the Court had occasion to discuss the jurisdictional nature of other
statutory elements of the citizen suit (namely, the ongoing violation requirement),
and a majority decided firmly that these statutory elements were not
juri~dictional.~Nevertheless, this distinction has gone unnoticed by courts
considering citizen suit notice issues, and most courts continue to describe the
statutory notice element as jursi&ctional.
The question of whether notice is jurisdictional or not has important
ramifications for citizen suit Litigation. The characterization of the notice
requirement as "jurisdictional" implicates the proper procedure for raising notice
objections, the means of curing notice defects, the question of waiver of notice
objections, and the timing of raising notice objections. This article will conduct
a brief review of the caselaw concerning the jurisdictional nature (or not) of the
notice requirement, a consideration of the as-yet unnoticed impact of SteelCo. on
the issue, and a discussion of the procedural and litigation ramifications of
characterizing the notice element as "jurisdictional."

* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Iaw
1 . 493 U.S. 20 (1 989).
2. I . at 31.

3. 523 U.S. 83, at 92-93 (1998).
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A. The Statutory Notice Provisions
Each of the federal environmental citizen suit statutes contains a notice
requirement.4 Typical of these provisions (and perhaps most frequently litigated)
is the citizen suit provision in the Clean Water Act (CWA), section 505@):
"Notice. No action may be commenced - . . . (A) prior to sixty days after the
plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to
the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of
the standard, limitation, or order. . . ."' The purpose of the notice requirement,
according to the legislative history of the original citizen suit provision in the
Clean Air Act, is to "trigger administrative action to get the relief that [the citizen]
Supreme Court has also opined that
might otherwise seek in the courts."%e
another purpose of the notice requirement is to permit the violator to come into
compliance and avoid litigation.'

B. Cure Law Interprting the Notice l'mvisions
A complete review of the development of citizen suit notice jurisprudence is
beyond the scope of this article.' Notice issues were frequently litigated in the
first two decades of citizen suit litigation. A split in the circuits developed
between those courts that considered the notice requirement to be absolute,
mandatory and jurisdictional, and those that read the notice provision as a
procedural requirement that allowed courts to take a more pragmatic, functional
approach. The former approach is probably best exemplified by the opinion of
Judge Wisdom in Gania v. Cecos International, I n c . V n Gania, plaintiffs initially
commenced a $1983"' action in territorial court a p s t a municipdty for illegally
disposing of hazardous waste at a landfill, in violation of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)." When the municipality removed the
case to federal court, plaintiffs sought to add a RCRA citizen suit claim under
4. see, c.g., 15 U.S.C. Ej 2619@) (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 1540@(2) (2000); 33 U.S.C. Ej 1365(b)
(2000); 42 U.S.C. § 3001-8@) (2000); 42 U.S.C. Ej 7604@) (2000); 42 U.S.C. Ej 9613(1) (2000); 42
U.S.C.$9659(d)(1) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(d) (2000).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1365@)(1)(r\)(2000).
6. 116 CONG.REC. 32,927 (1970).
7. Gwnltney of Smithfield, Ltd, v. Chesapeake Hay I;c>und.,Inc., 484 U.S. 49,59-60 (1987).
8. For an excellent, recent review of the development of thc law governing noticc issues,
sce liobin Kundis Craig, Noti@Letters and Notice Plcdn~:The Federa/ Rules ofCivi/ Pmrehm and he
S~fln'entyofEnvironmmta/Citi~rn
Suit Notin, 78 Cht. I, REV. 105 (1999).
9. 761 F.2d 76 (1st (:if. 1985).
10. 42 U.S.C. Ej 1983 (2000).
11. 42 U.S.C;$Ej 6901-6992 (2000). See Gama, 761 1;.2d at 78.
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RCRA § 7002(a)(l)(A)." The District Court denied an injunction, and plaintiffs
appealed to the First Circuit. The First Circuit raised the notice issue surr Jponte
and dismissed the case, holding that without notice, the District Court lacked
jurisdi~tion.'~
Judge Wisdom's opinion for the court reasoned that
[tlhe . . . language of the notice provision . . . is unambiguous: "No action may be
commenced" by private plaintiffs without sixty days' notice. The notice
requirement is not a technical wrinkle or superfluous formality that federal courts
may waive at will. We believe that it is part of the jurisdictional conferral from
Congress that cannot be altered by the co~rts.'~
The court went on to reject the so-called "pragmatic approach" taken by other
courts. The First Circuit's strict jurisdictional treatment of the notice issue is
apparent from the fact that it raised the issue on its own motion on the appeal,
despite the fact that the defendant, Cecos (apparently interested in preserving the
favorable decision below), argued in favor of j~risdiction.'~
The Third Circuit adopted the "pragmatic approach" that was rejected in
G a k . For example, in Pm@
v. CommiJsionerr, Townsh$ ofBn'stol,'('the court
allowed a Clean Water Act citizens suit to proceed despite the lack of formal
notice where the defendants had actual knowledge of the alleged violations more
than 60 days prior to suit." And in I'ymatuning Water Shed Citixensfor u Hygieenic
Envzmnment v. Eaton, the same Court held that the notice requirement could be
satisfied after commencement of the lawsuit as long as littgation was suspended
for an equivalent of the 60 day notice period.'* The Thlrd Circuit reasoned,
"This stay allowed them the time contemplated by the statute for taking
appropriate action.""'Thus, plaintiffs were permitted to cure their failure to gve
proper notice by giving post-complaint notice and suspending the litigation for
60 days. This sort of pragmatic-nd
distinctly non-jurisdictional-treatment of
notice issues was also adopted by the Second, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits."'

12. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(1\) (2000). See Gma, 761 F.2d at 78.
13. Gma, 761 P.2d at 78. 'rhc (:ourt also rejected the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims as a basis of
fcdcd jurisdiction, finding any § 1983 rcmcdy to be supplanted by the R(;l\,\ rcj.ylatory schcmc.
Id at 82.
14. Id at 79 (citations omitted).
15. Id at 78-79.
16. 754 P.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985).
17. Id at 506.
18. 644 P.W 995,996-97 (3d Cir. 1981).
19. Id at 997.
20. See I-iempstead County & Nrv. County l'roject v. United Sntcs liP1\,700 1:.2d 459,463
(8th Cir. 1983); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 524 1:.2d 79, 83-84 (2d (:ir. 1975);
Cir. 1974).
I.(:.
Natural Ilcs. Def. Council, Inc. v. 'l'rain, 510 I:.2d 692,698-703 @
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C. The Supreme Court's Hallstrom Decision
This pragmatic approach to notice was ultimately rejected by the Supreme
Court in Halhtmm v. Tilkamook Cotlnty." In Hulhtmm, property owners sued
Tillarnook County, claiming that the landfill violated standards under RCRA, and
sought relief from an imminent and substantial endangerment under the RCRA
citizen suit provision." The Hulhtmm plaintiffs also asserted common law
nuisance claims under the District Court's pendant jurisdction.'%lthough the
Hallstroms notified the defendant, Tillamook County, of their claims a year
before filing suit, the Hallstroms failed to provide written notice to EPA and the
Oregon Department of Environmental Quality ( D E Q , as required by RCRA
section 7002@)." When defendant moved to dsrniss on the grounds of lack of
notice, plaintiffs irnrnedlately sent notice to EPA and the Oregon DEQ." The
District Court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that EPA's and DEQ's
failure to act to remedy the problem within 60 days of receiving the postcomplaint notice meant that the pragmatic purposes of notice had been satisfied,
a trial, the Court ordered the
and that the case could proceed to trial.'"fter
County to remediate the violation."
The Ninth Circuit reversed, holdmg that the notice requirement was
mandatory and jurisdictional and adopting the reasoning ofJudge Wisdom in the
First Circuit Garcia decision.?"The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the conflict among the circuits and a f f m e d the Ninth
Circuit, emphatically holdmg that notice was a mandatory requirement prior to
Court resolved the issue specifically
the commencement of a citizen suit.'%e
in reliance on the language of the statute that "'[nlo action may be commenced
under paragraph (a)(l) of thls section. . . prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has
given notice of the violation."'"' According to the Court: "Because this language
is expressly incorporated by reference into 5 6972(a), it acts as a specific
h i t a t i o n on a citizen's right to bring suit. Under a literal readmg of the statute,
compliance with the 60-day notice provision is a mandatory, not optional,
condition precedent for suit."" The Court explicitly stopped short of decidng
whether this "condition precedent" was in fact a jurisdictional requirement: "In
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

493 U.S. 20 (1989).
Id at 23-24.
See I+aUstrom v. 'l'illamook County, 844 1';.2d598, 599 (9th Cir. 1987).
Haffrtmm,493 U.S. at 24; lee afro 42 U.S.C. $ 6972@)(1).
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 31.
Id at 25 (quoting 42 U.S. (:. § 69720(1) (1982)).
Id at 26.
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light of our literal interpretation of the statutory requirement, we need not
determine whether § 6972(b) is jurisdictional in the strict sense of the term.""
Justice Marshall dissented in Hallstmm and noted the importance of this
reservation of the jurisdiction issue.
The Court might be read to suggest that failure to comply with the 60-day notice
provision deprives the court of subject-matter jurisdiction, thereby obligating a
court to dismiss a case filed in violation of the notice provision no matter when the
defendant raises the issue - indeed, regardless of whether the defendant does so.
As there is no dispute in this case that respondent timely raised the claim that
petitioners had not complied with the notice provision, the question whether a
defendant may waive the notice requirement is not before the Court, and any
"resolution" of the question is necessarily dictum. In any event, I do not
understand the Court to express any view on whether the notice requirement is
~aivable.~'
Justice Marshall thus points out the most critical ramification of characterizing
notice as "jurisdictional." If the issue is indeed jursdictional, it cannot be waived
by the defendant and, indeed, could be raised for the first time after an adverse
judgment or even on appeal.
In HaIhtmm, the plaintiffs were sent back to refde their case after seven years
of litigation and a favorable judgment after trial. The f-Ialhtmm plaintiffs were at
least informed of defendants' notice defense early in the litigation and had the
option of refiling their case at that time to cure the notice defect. If notice were
indeed jurisdictional then an environmental citizen plaintiff could, in theory,
have their case dismissed after years of litigation when the defendant raises the
notice issue for the frrst time on appeal, long after any opportunity to cure the
defect has passed. The issue becomes even sticher when the plaintiff has given
some form of notice to the proper parties, but the defendant challenges the
sufficiency of that notice late in the litigation.

D. Post-Hallstrom Cases on Notice
Since Halhtmm was decided, notice issues continue to be actively litigated. As
the citizen suit plaintiff bar has become aware of the notice requirement, fewer
cases deal with failure to g v e any notice and instead address dsputes over the
adequacy of the notice given to describe the violations sued upon, proper service
and naming of the notice recipient.% Most courts considering notice defenses
32. HaIlrtmm, 493 U.S. at 31.
33. W at 34 n.* (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
34. See, e.g., Southwest Ctr. for Hiological Diversity v. United Statcs Hurcau of Itcclamation,
143 1;.3d 51 5,520-21 (9th Cir. 1998) (addrrssing a failure to describe specific activities complained
of); Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. Ikd. llmcrgcncy Mjpnt. Agency, 126 I:.3d 461, 464 (3d (:it. 1997)
(involving notice served on Secretary of Interior instead of Secretary of (:ommcrce in 13ndangcrcd
Species Act case concerning marine species); Atl. Statcs Icpl l:ound., Inc., v. Stroh Die ( k i n g
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since HalIrttvm continue to describe the notice issue as "j~risdictiona1,"~j
and,
despite the Supreme Court's explicit reservation of the question in Halhtmm,
some courts cite Hallrtmm for the proposition that notice is a jurisdictional
requirement.3"n
one unusual post-Halhtmm case, the Fifth Circuit explicitly
rejected an attempt to raise a notice defense for the first time on appeal, and held
that the notice requirement was not juris~lictional.~'

11. THELI'lTLE N ~ T ~ C E
JURISDI(TIONAL
D
HOl.L)IN<; 0 1 ; THE STEEL
COMPANYCASK
Steel Co. v. Cjtz~ensfora Better Envitonment" is not a case about the notice
requirements of the federal environmental statutes. Nevertheless, the Steel Co.
majority opinion contains an extensive discussion of the distinction between
statutory citizen suit elements and jurisdictional requirements that bears directly
on the jurisdiction nature of notice requirement~.~"e case is noteworthy (or
notorious, depending on one's perspective) in citizen suit circles as the watershed
case in Justice Scalia's Article I11 standing jurisprudence. In Steel Co., the
Supreme Court extended the continuing violation requirement that it adopted as
a matter of Clean Water Act statutory construction in Gwaltney ofSmithfiefd,Lld
v. Che~opeakeBay Founriaton, Znc"' to be an essential element of an ~ r t i c i eI11 case
or c o n t r o v e r ~ ~ . ~ '
A brief digression into the continuing violation element of citizen suits is
necessary to understand the implications of Steef Co. for notice issues. A decade
earlier, in Gwaltney, the Supreme Court held, as a matter of statutory construction
under the lea; Water Act, that an allegation of an ongoing violation was a
Co., 116 F.3d 814,820 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting challenge to suit based on effluent rcdirectcd to
different outfall than that identified in notice letter); Pub. Interest ltesearch Group of N.J., Inc. v.
FIercules,Inc., 50 F.3d 1239; 1248 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that noticc need not specifically idct~tify
each violation at issue); Wash. Trout v. McCaitr Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351,1352,1354-55 (9th (:u.
1995) (holding that noticc given by partics other than plaintiff was not sufficient); Iludson
ILivcrkecper Fund, Inc. v. I'utnam I-iosp. Ctr.. Inc. 891 P. Supp. 152, 155 (S.1I.N.Y. 1995)
(dismissing for failure to give noticc idcntifying spccific dates of violations).
143 17.3d at 520; HawbIiUSea Tuflh,126 1:.3d
35. See, eg.,Sou~bwestCh..jirBiobQcaIDi~msi~,
at 471;AtL StatesLagalFounn!, Inr., 116 1 ' 3 at 820; Marbled Murrelct v. Habbit, 83 1i.3d 1068,1072
(9th Cir. 1996); Wab. Tmuf, 45 1;.3d at 1355; Hudron Riwkqbw Fund, Inr. 891 1;. Supp. at 155
(panting motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).
36. See, e.g.,AM Int'l, Inc. v. Datacard Gorp., 106 F.3d 1342,1353 (7th Cir. 1997) (Ripple,J.,
concurrind; Pub. Interest Rcscarch Group of N.J.. lnc. v. Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1189 (3d (:ir.
1995).
37. Sierra Club v. Yeuttcr, 926 F.2d 429,437 (5th Cir. 1991).
38. 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
39. Id. at 89-93.
40. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
41. StcrlCo., 523 U.S. at 109.
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necessary element of a citizen suit.4' The Court focused on the present-tense
"alleged to be in violation" language of section 505(a)(l) of the CWA to hold that
such a suit was available only where plaintiffs could make a good faith allegation
reaching
that the violations were continuing as of the date suit commenced.'"n
this conclusion, the Court couched the question in "jurisdictional" terms: "In t h s
case, we must decide whether $ 505(a) of the Clean Water Act. . . confers federal
jurisdiction over citizen suits for wholly past violations.'"'
A student of the Gtvaltny opinion might be excused, therefore, for
understanding the "continuing violation" requirement to be a jurisdictional
element of a citizen-plaintiffs case. By extension, other similar statutory citizen
suit elements might also be understood to be "jurisdictional." But in Steel Co.,the
Court unequivocally and emphatically rejected a reading of the statutory citizen
suit elements as being "j~risdictional."~~
Steel Co. addressed the exact same "continuing violation" element of a citizen
suit as Gwaltny did, only this time the question arose under the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Ihow Act (EPCRA).* Unlike the CWA's
"alleged to be in violation" provision, EPCRA's citizen suit provision allows an
action "against. .. [a]n owner or operator of a facility for failure to. . . [clomplete
and submit an inventory form under section 11022(a) of this title . . . [or]
[clomplete and submit a toxic chemical release form under section 11023(a) of
this title.'"' So there was at least some question of whether, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, the EPCRA citizen suit required a continuing violation
the same way as the CWA's more emphatically present-tense "alleged to be in
violation" language did.
A majority of the Supreme Court skipped over the statutory interpretation
question in Steel Co. and went straight to the Article I11 jurisdictional question of
whether a citizen could satisfy the redressabllity element of standing where no
violations existed at the time she commenced suit. The Court ultimately held that
the citizen plaintiff could not." Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment,
however, in an opinion that seriously questioned the majority's Article I11
analysis. Justice Stevens preferred to avoid the constitutional question and would
have resolved the issue by extending the Gwaltny holding to EPCRA as a matter
of statutory interpretation?' Justice Stevens reasoned that since the Article I11
standing inquiry and the statutory interpretation question were both

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

484 U.S. at 59-60.

Id

M at 52.
Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89-90.
42 U.S.C. $9 11001-11050 (2000).
42 U.S.C.9 11046(a)(l)(A)(ii)-(iv) (2000).
SteefCo., 523 U.S. at 109.
Id at 132-33 (Stevens, J., concurrinp3.
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jurisdictional, the Court should avoid reaching an unnecessary constitutional
holding and resolve the case on statutory grounds."'
T h e majority answered Justice Stevens's opinion with an emphatic rejection
of his assumption that the statutory requirements of a citizen suit were
jurisdictional in nature. Although the Court's discussion of the jurisdictional
nature vel non of statutory citizen suit elements focused on the continuing
violation element, its reasoning ought well apply to the notice requirement. In
rejecting the jurisdictional character of the continuing violation requirement, the
majority held:
It is M y established in our cases that the absence of a valid (as opposed to
arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., the
courts' statutory or constitutionalpowertoadjudicate the case. As we stated in Be//
u. Hood, "[jlurisdiction . . . is not defeated.. . by the possibility that the averments
might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover."
Rather, the district court has jurisdiction if "the right of the petitioners to recover
under their complaint will be sustained if the Constitution and laws of the United
States are given one construction and will be defeated if they are given another,"
unless the claim "clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose
of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and
frivolous." Dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the
inadequacy of the federal claim is proper only when the claim is "so insubstantial,
implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely
devoid of merit as not to involve a federal contro~ers~."~'
The majority went o n to reject Justice Stevens's reading of Gwultny as a
jurisdictional holding, going so far as to refer to that decision as a "drive-by"
jurisdictional discussion without any precedential value:
Justice Stevens relies on our treatment of a similar issue as jurisdictional in
Gwaftny ofSmithjieki, L.td u. Che~apcakeB q Foundation, Inc., . . . .
m h e Glvaltny opinion does not display the slightest awareness that anythmg turned

upon whether the existence of a cause of action for past violations was technically

jurisdictional - as indeed nothing of substance did. The District Court had
statutory jurisdiction over the suit in any event, since continuing violations were
also alleged. It is true, as Justice STEVENS points out, that the issue of Article 111
standing which is addressed at the end of the opinion should technically have beet1
addressed at the outset if the statutory question was not jurisdictional. But that also
did not really matter, since Article I11 standing was in any event found. The short
of the matter is that the jurisdictional character of the elements of the cause of
action in Gwahney made no substantive difference (nor even any procedural
difference that the Court seemed aware ot), had been assumed by the parties, and
was assumed without discussion by the Court. We have often said that drive-by

50. StreLCo., 523 U.S. at 133.
51. Id-at 89 (dtcntion in original) (citntio~isomitted)
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jurisdictional r b g s of this sort (if Gwaltncy can even be called a ruhg on the point
rather than a dictum) have no precedential effect."

Steel Co. thus rejected the notion that citizen suit elements became
"jurisdictional" simply because the statute goes on to say that "[tlhe district court
shall have jurisdiction in actions brought under subsection (a) of this section."'"
The majority's reasoning did not turn on any distinction between the negative
"no action may be commenced" language of the notice requirements and the
more affirmative "any person may commence an action" language of the citizen
suit. Taken at face value, at least, the majority opinion in Steel Co. would suggest
that notice, like a continuing violation, is not a jurisdctional requirement in a
citizen suit.

Despite the Supreme Court's reasoning in SteelCo. that statutory elements of
a citizen suit are decidedly nonjurisdictional in nature, the lower federal courts
continue to describe notice as a "jurisdictional" issue.5i Indeed, a LEXIS search
fails to reveal any reported decision in which Steel Co. is even discussed or cited
in connection with a discussion of the jurisdictional nature of notice issues.j5
Despite this lack of judicial reaction to Steel Co., it is hard to find a rational
dstinction between the ongoing violation requirement found to be emphatically
non-jurisdictional in that case and the notice requirement still described as
jurisdctional by the vast majority of reported decisions. Both wire statutory
elements of a citizen suit claim for relief. While the ongoing violation phrase is
preceded by "any person [or citizen] may commence a civil a~tion,"~%ndthe
notice provisions are prefaced "[nlo action may be corn~nenced,"~~
it is hard to
draw a jurisdictional .distinction between the positive and negative phrasings.jn
52. StrelCo., 523 U.S. at 90-91 (citations omitted). The majority also suggested the possibility
that a difference in the language of the citizen suit grant in the CWA and EPClW (night justify a
distinction in determining the "jurisdictional" naNrc of thc citizen suit elements undcr each statutc.
Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c) (2000).
54. See, e.g.. Catskill Mountains Chapter of'l'rout Unlimited, lnc. v. City of Ncw York, 273
F.3d 481, 489 (2d Cir. 2001); Hd. of 'l'rustccs v. City of I'ainesvillc, 200 1'.3d 396, 400 (6th (:ir.
1999);SouthwestCtr. for Hiologicd Diversity v. United States Hurcvu of Reclamation, 143 V.3d 51 5,
522 (9th Cir. 1998); l'ricnds of Frederick Seig Grovc #94 v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 124
F. Supp. 2d 1161,1164 (N.D. Cd. 2000).
55. 171e only such reference appears in Nat'lParkr ConsenationAss'nv. Tenn. Vo&Aufh.., 175
F. Supp 2d 1071,1077 (ED. Tenn. 2001), where the Court assumes that notice is jurisdictional and
cites Steel Co. for the proposition that the plaintiff has the burden of proving subject matter
jurisdiction.
56. 42 U.S.C. 5 11046(a)(l) (2000).
57. 42 U.S.C.§ 11046(d) (2000).
58. In Sierra Chb v. Yeutter,926 1:.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit points out that the

Heinonline - - 10 Widener L. Rev. 57 2003-2004

58

Widener Law Rcuiew

[Vol. 10:49

Justice Scalia's opinion in Steel Co. suggested a possible dstinction between the
Clean Water Act jurisdictional grant, whch specifically states that jurisdction
shall be "without regard to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the
partie~,"~%ndthe jurisdictional grant of EPCRA, which omits this language."'
Nevertheless, it is hard to see why this language, which seems only to suggest that
federal question jurisdiction was contemplated rather than diversity jurisdiction,
converts the statutory elements of 'the Clean Water Act citizen suit to
jurisdictional requirements, while leaving them non-jurisdctional in the other
environmental citizen suits. Moreover, even if such a distinction were valid,
notice should be considered non-jurisdictional under the statutes that omit the
Clean Water Act's citizenship and amounts in controversy language.
Post-Steel Co. courts have drawn no such distinction and seem to be simply
unaware that the Supreme Court has answered the question it left open in
HulIrham namely, whether citizen suit elements such as notice are "jurisdictional
in the strictest sense of the word."" Under Steel Co. they are not. Presumably,
the courts will reach this conclusion once the citizen suit bar begins to point the
Steel Co. holding out to them.

IV. WtlY DOESIT MATTER WI-IETMER
NOTICE
ISJURISDI(,~'IONAI.
O R No'r
One reason courts have not paid very close attention to the jurisprudence of
jurisdiction when deciding notice issues is that in the vast majority of cases, it
does not matter. Notice issues are usually raised at the very outset of the citizen
suit. If the court determines that notice was proper, the case proceeds. If the
court determines notice was not properly given, under HalIrtmm, the court has no
choice but to dismiss. For this reason, courts have rarely had to consider closely
the jurisdictional characterization of notice issues.
This situation changes where a defendant fads to raise notice issues at the
outset of litigation. If notice is truly a jurisdctional issue, then a defendant
cannot waive a notice objection, even if the issue is raised for the fvst time on
appeal. Indeed, the Court may (and should) address jurisdictional issues on
appeal even if the parties fail to raise them. Whether notice is jurisdictional or
not also affects the appropriate means of raising notice defects and of curing a
notice defect once it has been raised.

same "no action shall bc. commcnccd" l m ~ u a hiincorpontcs
~
the dcfcnsc of diligent prosecution.
and that the dilihvnt prosecution dcfcnsc dtrs not incorporate the kind of "bright-line" hctual
determinations normally associated with a truly jurisdictional rcyuircment. 1d. at 437.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (2000).
60. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Hettcr Env't, 523 U.S. 83.90 (1998).
61. See s@m notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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A. Waiver by Dejinndannt
If notice were jurisdictional in the strictest sense of the word, then the issue
could not be waived by the defendant, intentionally or unintentionally, and
indeed, an appellate court would have the obligation to raise the issue even if the
parties did not."' This strictly jurisdictional, non-waivable approach is precisely
the approach taken by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in its pre-HulIrtmm
Gania decision. In that case, the Court apparently raised the notice issue sua
sponte on the appeal and dismissed RCRA claims for failure to give the requisite
notice.6J Conversely (and more recently), the Fifth Circuit specificallyconsidered
the issue of waiver in Siem C l ~ v.b Yeutter!' The Fifth Circuit held that notice
was not strictly jurisdictional and was therefore waived for failure to raise the
issue at all before the trial
If, as SteelCo. implies, notice is non-jurisdictional, then it is waivable. The next
question is: under what circumstances has a citizen suit defendant waived a notice
defense? Clearly, under Yeutfer,a defendant who fails to raise the issue at all
before the trial court has waived the issue. But can waiver occur earlier in the
proceedings? Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9, which requires particularity
for pleading denials of a condition precedent," may have some bearing on this
issue.

1. Rule 9 and Pleading of Conditions Precedent
Recall that in Hallrtmm, the Supreme Court held that notice is a mandatory
"condition precedent" to the commencement of an environmental citizen suit.67
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9 has something to say about pleading
requirements for conditions precedent: "In pleading the performance or
occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver g e n e d y that all
conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred. A denial of
performance or occurrence shall be made qe~.ificulh
and withparticukzrify."" At least at face
value, if notice is a non-jurisdictional "condltion precedentyyto a citizen suit, a
citizen plaintiff need only plead generally that all conditions precedent to suit
have occurred, and the onus is on the defendant to plead "specifically and with
particularity" the manner in which it claims conditions precedent were not met.
There is no reported decision addressing the question of whether citizen suit
notice is the sort of "condition precedent" subject to Rule 9(c). In general,
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Ins. Corp. of Ir.. Ltd. v. Compagnie dm Bauxites de Guince, 456 U.S. 694.702 (1982).
Set Garcia v. Cecos Infl, Inc., 761 1i.2d 76 (1st CU. 1985).
926 P.2d 429 (5th (:U. 1991).
Id at 434-37.
Ste idra note 68 and accompanying tcxt.
See s q r n notes 1-2 and accompanying t c x t
1:1m.R.(:rv. 1'. 9(c) (emphasis added).
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jurisdictional allegations have been held not to be subject to Rule 9(c), while nonjurisdictional conditions precedent are." So, if Steel Co. indeed establishes that
notice is not a jurisdictional issue, Rule 9(c) ought to apply. A line of Court of
Appeals cases considering employment discrimination claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act makes clear that the Rule 9(c) pleading requirements apply
to statutory as well as contractual conditions precedent.70 This line of cases
suggests that Rule 9(c)'s requirement of particularity of denials of condtions
precedent should apply to citizen suit notice issues.
A defendant's failure to deny a condition precedent with particularity is
grounds to exclude any evidence presented by defendant on the issue.'' Failure
to deny satisfaction of a condition precedent with particularity has also been held
to constitute a waiver of the issue by a defendant." Accorhgly, a defendant who
fails to assert a notice defense specifically and with particularity in its answer
should be held to have waived the issue.
2. Method of Raising Issue-12@)(l)

or Rule 56

The non-jurisdictional character of notice issues also affects the proper
manner of resolving notice objections prior to mal. The proper method of
raising a jurisdictional objection is a motion pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 12@)(1),and indeed, the same courts that have reflexively treated
the notice issue as "jurisdictional" have routinely resolved the issue in the context
of a 12@)(1)motion.'-' A motion under Rule 12@)(1)allows a court to consider
matters outside the pleading^.'^

69. EEOC v. W. Fdec. Co., 364 P. Supp. 188,190 (n. Md. 1973), E130C v. Griffin Whccl
Co., 360 F. Supp. 424.425-26 (N.D. Ala. 1973); EEOC v. Guar. Sav. & I m n Ass'n. 369 1:. Supp.
36,37 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
70. See, e.g., Steams v. Consol. M~mt.,Inc., 747 F.W 1105,1111-12 (7th Cir. 1984); ISliO(:
v. Klinglcr Elec. Coip., 636 F.W 104,106 (5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. 'rimes-l'icayune l'ubl'g (Iorp.,
500 F.2d 392 (5th Ck. 1974) (per curiam), &. hmed, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); EEOCI v. Standard Forgc
& 11x1~
Co., 496 P.W 1392,1393 (5th Cir. 1974), nrl. Acme4 419 U.S. 1106 (1975); 1<1X)(:v Wah
Chang Albany Corp., 499 1:.2d 187,190 (9th (:if. 1974).
71. McKce-krpr-Mansucto, Inc.. v. Hd. of Ed.,626 I'W 559.562 (7th Cir. 1980).
72. Brooks v. Monnx Sys. for Bus., lnc., 873 F.2d 202,205 (8th (Iir. 1989). ntf. hn~ed,493
U.S. 853 (1989).
73. Catskill Mountains Chapter of 'Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 1:.3d at
481,485 (W Cir. 2001); Atl. States LC'pl ITound., Inc. v. Stroh Die (:asting(:o., 116 F.3d 814,82021 (7th Cir. 1997); Friends of 1:rcderick Scig Grove #94 v. Sonrma County Water Agency, 124 1'.
Supp. 2d 1161,1164,1169 (N.D.
Cal. 2000); Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. I'utnam I-losp.(:tr.,
Inc., 891 F. Supp. 152,153,155 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
74. See, e.g., Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000,1003 (10th Cir. 1995); (Ialvcrt v. Sharp, 748
V.2d 861, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1984), &. denied, 471 U.S. 1132 (1985); Grafon Corp., v. I Iauscrmann,
602 F.2d 781,783 (7th Cir. 1979).
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Although courts have increasingly used the Rule 12@)(1) motion to cover a
larger universe of defense^,'^ if notice, like an ongoing violation, is merely a
statutory element of a cause of action, then a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) would
be the more appropriate means of challenging the legal sufficiency of the
complaint with respect to notice issue. Of course, if the 12@)(6)motion requires
reference to matters outside ofthe pleadings (for example, if the complaint does
not attach the notice letter, or the defense of lack of notice is based on a failure
properly to serve the notice on the proper parties), then the Court would convert
the motion into one for summary judgment under Rule 56.7"
As a practical matter, it ordinarily makes little difference whether the motion
proceeds as one under Rule 12@)(1) or one under Rule 56, as the parties will
have an opportunity to submit evidence on the notice issue in the form of
affidavits, and the Court will ultimately make a determination whether a factual
hearing is required to resolve the issue. However, where a genuine factual issue
exists concerning the service of notice, the means for resolving this issue may
differ depending on whether the issue is treated as one of subject matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12@)(1) or a matter of the merits. Indeed, the notice
issue could conceivably be an issue for a jury trial if it is a merits i~sue,'~while the
Court has the option of resolving the issue itself if it is an issue of subject matter
j~risdiction.~'

The characterization of notice as jurisdictional also affects the appropriate
means of curing a notice defect once raised by the defendant or ruled on by the
Court. As notice defects are usually easily cured, a plaintiff confronted with a
notice objection will often simply re-notice the case and wait out the sixty or
ninety days to cure the defect. Plaintiffs are tempted simply to amend the
original complaint at the end of the new waiting period. This procedure is clearly
insufficient to cure a notice defect if notice is jurisdictional and may still be
problematic wen if notice is considered "procedural" but "mandatory" under
Haihtmm.
Subject matter jurisdiction is usually measured as of the time of filing of the
complaint, and subsequent events will not ordinarily cure a jurisdictional defect
that existed at the time of frlir~g.~'Accordingly, if notice were considered
75. See 5A CI~AKLLS
ALAN WKIC;II'L'
& I\H'I'IIUR R. MIIJ.I:.R,
I;I:.I)L:IuI.
I'I~A(:I.I(:I:. A N I )
§ 1350 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 2003).
76. CJ Sierra Club v. Shell Oil Co.,817 11.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1987). nrt. denied. 484 U.S.
985 (1987).
77. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
MILLER, svpm note 75, at § 1350.
78. Scegenm& WRIGHT&
79. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 n.4 (1992); 1:ricnds of the
Earth, Inc. v. Chevron Chem. Co., 919 1.: Supp. 1042 (ED. Tcx. 1996), rsv'don othergm~ndr,129
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jurisdictional, filing an amended complaint after the waitingperiod expired would
never suffice to restore subject matter jurisdiction that was laclung at the time of
the original complaint. Even if notice is considered non-jurisdictional, the
holding of Halh-trom casts serious doubt on simple amendment of the original
complaint. In HalIrtmm, the Court required dismissal of a case filed before
proper notice was given, and specifically rejected the dlstrict court's approach of
allowing the original case to proceed after waiting the requisite notice period.
Given the Court's reliance on a strict literal reading of the "[nlo such action may
be commenced" language of the notice provision, reliance on an amended
complaint in an action that was commenced prior to satisfaction of notice
requirements is risky. The Hath-tmm Court noted that the proper way to cure the
defect would be for plaintiff to commence a new action once the notice and delay
period had expired."
Several courts have endorsed the procedure of filing a new case after the new
notice period has expired in order to cure a notice defect. These courts have
specifically endorsed a separate action and a motion to consolidate with the
previously filed case where the notice objection goes to some, but not all of
plaintiffs' claims.R'

Courts continue to characterize the citizen suit notice requirements as a
question of subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in H a l h m v.
T i t h o o k County expressly declined to characterize notice as being jurisdictional
in the "strict[est] sense of the term." More recently, the Supreme Court
determined in Steel Co. case that the ongoing violation element of a citizen suit is
decidedly not jurisdictional. This determination strongly suggests that the notice
element of a citizen suit is likewise non-jurisdictional in nature. If notice is nonjurisdictional, then under Rule 7(c) plaintiffs need only plead generally for
satisfaction of conditions precedent to suit, and the onus is on the defendant to
deny proper notice specifically and with particularity. Failure of the defendant
to so plead would constitute a waiver of notice objections. If notice is not a
jurisdictional issue, then the appropriate means to resolve a notice objection is
through a motion under Rule 12@)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. In any
event, the proper way for a plaintiff to cure a potential notice defense is to give
proper notice and file a new complsunt after the waiting period expires, rather
than to amend the pending complaint.
113d 826 (5th Cir. 1997).
80. 1.ldstrom v. 'Tinmook County, 493 U.S.20, 32 (1989).
81. See, eg., I-tlawksbill Scn 'l'urtlc v. ICd. Iirncrgcncy M p t . rigcncy, 126 1;.3d 461,473 (3J
Cir. 1997); (:oalition Apinst (:olumbus Ctr. v. City of New York, 750 1:. Supp. 93. 96 (S.1I.N.Y.
1990).
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